Legal analysis of the FutureID Broker by Schroers, Jessica et al.
 
 
Document name: SP4/ WP41 Page:   0 of 36 
Reference: 41.6 Dissemination:      
PU 
Version:  Version 1.0 Status: Status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D41.6 
Legal analysis of the FutureID Broker
1
 
 
 
 
 
Related SP / WP SP4/ WP41 Document 
Reference 
D41.6 
Related 
Deliverable(s) 
D12.9, D32.8, D33.6, D41.1, 
D41.2 
Dissemination 
Level 
   PU   
Lead Participant KUL Lead Author Jessica Schroers 
Contributors Jessica Schroers (KUL) 
Colette Cuijpers (RU) 
Hannah Obersteller (ULD) 
Pedro Malaquias (KUL) 
Reviewers Alfredo Rial (IBM) 
Juan Carlos Pérez Baún 
(ATOS) 
This document is issued within the frame and for the purpose of the FutureID project. This project has received funding from the 
European Unions Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 318424. 
This document and its content are the property of the FutureID Consortium. All rights relevant to this document are determined by 
the applicable laws. Access to this document does not grant any right or license on the document or its contents. This document or 
its contents are not to be used or treated in any manner inconsistent with the rights or interests of the FutureID Consortium or the 
Partners detriment. Each FutureID Partner may use this document in conformity with the FutureID Consortium Grant Agreement 
provisions
                                                          
 
1
 The original title “Legal analysis of the Identity Broker” has been adjusted due to terminology changes during the 
project.  
Document Identification 
Date 29/10/2015 
Status Final 
Version  Version 1.0 
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D41.6  
 
 
Document name: SP4/ WP41 Page: 1 of 36 
Reference: 41.6 Dissemination:   PU Version:  Version 1.0 Status: Final 
 
 
1. Executive Summary 
This deliverable provides an analysis of the legal framework surrounding the FutureID Broker as a legal 
entity, with a special focus on liability.  
The deliverable starts with an introduction to the FutureID Broker and the FutureID Ecosystem. This is 
followed by an explanation of the importance of liability within the identity management context as an 
enabler of trust. The section provides a high-level conceptualization of the various expectations held by 
the different entities that participate in FutureID.  
The main part of this deliverable gives an overview of the different sources of liability and how they 
could apply to the FutureID Broker. First an overview of non-contractual liability, resulting from Data 
Protection law, e-signature/eIDAS legislation and tort law. For data protection law, the distinction 
between controller and processor remains important. In case the FutureID Broker is a controller, it will 
be subject to more stringent obligations and, hence, a higher risk for liability. On the other hand, if the 
FutureID Broker is simply a processor, it shall be subject to less onerous obligations, although it might 
still face liability claims. Depending on the national implementation of the data protection law, the 
FutureID Broker as a processor could be held directly liable, or indirectly via contractual clauses in the 
controller-processor contract by the controller/SP.  
The legislation on electronic signatures changed, and was broadened under the eIDAS Regulation. It also 
covers other trust services and notified identity services. In this regard, the risk of liability is lower for the 
FutureID Broker, as with its current service profile it does not qualify as a certification service 
provider/trust service provider in the sense of the legislation. The role of Brokers such as the FutureID 
Broker is not specifically considered under the eIDAS Regulation. If the FutureID Broker would receive an 
assertion from a national operator of the authentication procedure, based on a notified eID, the 
FutureID Broker as a legal entity in Claims Transformer Mode could be considered a relying party. In this 
case, the eIDAS provision might give the FutureID Broker some rights vis-à-vis the party issuing the 
electronic identification means, the party operating the authentication procedure or the notifying 
Member State. Nevertheless it has to be taken into account that the rules are aimed at public services 
and that the Regulation leaves the choice to accept private relying parties to the Member States, 
including the possibility to define terms of access, which could entail liability limitations.  
Tort law varies substantially between Member States, but usually requires a fault, a damage and a causal 
connection between the fault and the damage. It will often be difficult for the user and the SP to 
demonstrate that they suffered a material damage. Non-material damage can be awarded, but the 
judges are reluctant in this regard. Taking into account the heightened importance of data, this might 
possibly change in the future. The characterisation of the fault is another difficulty, as it is not yet clear 
which rights and obligations the FutureID Broker has. However, obligations could result from legislation 
such as data protection law, applicable standards but also contracts. In case of contracts the failure to 
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comply with contractual obligations could possibly not only give rise to pre-defined contractual liability, 
but also to tort liability, depending on the national law. 
The contractual liability will depend on the exact provisions in the contracts. The reference architecture 
envisages a strongly decentralized deployment. This would entail that every participant of the FutureID 
ecosystem would enter into contracts with the party they rely upon, and, as part of their contractual 
freedom, can decide on the contract provisions. This will most likely result in a chain of contracts. As 
such, it is important that the FutureID Broker enters into back-to-back liability arrangements to ensure 
that no gap in liability coverage exists, leaving the Broker with uncovered risks. In particular in case of 
usage of a single trade mark or distinctive sign, it might be advisable that a governing entity would 
establish and (possibly) enforce obligations for the different participants. Points which should be 
considered in the contracts are the role and responsibilities of each partner, the applicable law, dispute 
resolution and which liabilities are accepted towards each stakeholder (including financial limitations). 
The contracting partners should also consider Service Level Agreements and provide for obligations to 
implement and follow inputs and instructions from the governing entity. Finally they should cover the 
data protection requirements, e.g. by controller-processor contracts.  
To complete the analysis, the position of the FutureID Broker under the Directive 2000/31/EC is 
assessed. The provisions of this Directive seem to apply as the FutureID Broker will probably provide an 
information society service. However, it does not seem likely that the FutureID Broker can benefit from 
the liability exemptions. An exception might be the Broker in Dispatcher Mode, who might be able to 
invoke the exemption of mere conduit (this is however disputable). As the FutureID Broker will not 
provide a hosting service, it is clear that the exemptions of caching and hosting are not applicable.  
Finally the analysis concludes with a case study on failures in authentication systems in the Netherlands. 
These examples show that the risk of liability claims is currently not high and can be countered with 
limited liability clauses. However, a bigger risk seems to be the loss of trust.  
It is advisable that the FutureID Broker establishes adequate liability limitations and back-to-back liability 
arrangement, while at the same time ensuring the trust between all the parties. This could include the 
provision of simple redress mechanisms and support and contact points. Users should have support 
when problems arise and it should be avoided to oblige users to prove what went wrong in a system 
they do not understand. Finally, logging is useful, as it can provide evidence in the question whose fault 
the failure was, and therefore facilitate getting redress from the liable party.   
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4. Project Description 
The FutureID project builds a comprehensive, flexible, privacy-aware and ubiquitously usable identity 
management infrastructure for Europe, which integrates existing eID technology and trust 
infrastructures, emerging federated identity management services and modern credential technologies 
to provide a user-centric system for the trustworthy and accountable management of identity claims.  
The FutureID infrastructure will provide great benefits to all stakeholders involved in the eID value chain. 
Users will benefit from the availability of a ubiquitously usable open source eID client that is capable of 
running on arbitrary desktop PCs, tablets and modern smart phones. FutureID will allow application and 
service providers to easily integrate their existing services with the FutureID infrastructure, providing 
them with the benefits from the strong security offered by eIDs without requiring them to make 
substantial investments.  
This will enable service providers to offer this technology to users as an alternative to 
username/password based systems, providing them with a choice for a more trustworthy, usable and 
innovative technology. For existing and emerging trust service providers and card issuers FutureID will 
provide an integrative framework, which eases using their authentication and signature related products 
across Europe and beyond.  
To demonstrate the applicability of the developed technologies and the feasibility of the overall 
approach FutureID will develop two pilot applications and is open for additional application services who 
want to use the innovative FutureID technology. 
Future ID is a three-year duration project funded by the European Commission Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 318424. 
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5. Outline and scope 
This deliverable provides an overview of liability in identity management systems, specifically for the 
FutureID Broker in the FutureID system. As the Broker service is a technical component, a legal analysis 
would not yield many results. Therefore the FutureID Broker and its role in the bigger ecosystem, as 
envisaged in the reference architecture, will be analysed and legal considerations be outlined.  
Section 5 describes the FutureID Broker and the FutureID Ecosystem. Section 6 explains the importance 
of liability in an identity management context, and the risks and stakeholder expectations in the FutureID 
system. Section 7 provides an overview of sources of liability and whether possible liability exceptions of 
Directive 1999/93/EC might be invoked by the FutureID Broker. The main part of the analysis can be 
found in this section, where the different sources of liability (legal obligations, tort and contracts) are 
examined. Finally an example of failures within identity management systems in the Netherlands is 
presented, to show whether and how liability risks up until now have realised in practice.  
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6. The FutureID Broker 
A FutureID Broker is a legal entity which provides the FutureID authentication service. The FutureID 
authentication service is a service which allows users to authenticate themselves towards Service 
Providers (SP) using pre-existing credentials. The technical component which makes this possible is 
referred to as the “Broker Service” (BS). 
The Broker Service can operate in two modes, Dispatcher and Claims Transformer Mode. In the 
Dispatcher Mode, the Broker Service only serves as a dispatcher, meaning that it determines an 
appropriate Authentication Service, which performs the authentication of the user and returns the result 
of the authentication to the requesting SP.2 In this mode the Broker Service does not sign any assertion 
or credential but simply serves as a proxy.3 The Claims Transformer Mode can be seen as an extension of 
the Dispatcher Mode, where the Broker Service transforms the externally authenticated attributes into a 
new credential or token.4 The Claims Transformer Mode can have different settings. The simplest form 
will issue a short-lived token to the SP, e.g. using SAML-assertions, while in a more advanced setting the 
Broker Service can issue long-term privacy-enhancing attribute-based credentials (Privacy-ABCs) to the 
user.5  
The Broker Service can be implemented as a technical component at the SP’s side, but can also be 
provided by a separate legal entity, i.e. a FutureID Broker.  
 
6.1 The FutureID Ecosystem6 
The different stakeholders of the FutureID Ecosystem have been described in D32.8, Section 6 and 7.  For 
this analysis, we will describe potential relations and scenarios between the different stakeholders. It is 
assumed that the user possesses one or more credentials issued by the legal entity “issuer”. The user 
would like to access a service provided by the legal entity “SP”. The SP outsourced the authentication to 
the legal entity “FutureID Broker”, who operates the technical component BS (Broker Service).  
1.) The FutureID Broker can offer its services in dispatcher mode 
 
2.) The FutureID Broker can offer its services in claims-transformer mode  
                                                          
 
2
 D41.1, p. 4.  
3
 D41.1, p.4.  
4
 D41.2, p. 41.  
5
 D41.2, p.41.  
6
 Based on information of Bud Brügger.  
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When the FutureID Broker operates in claims-transformer mode, it could be possible that either (a) the 
FutureID Broker is capable of verifying the credential directly (by operating a software component such 
as the UAS) or (b) the FutureID Broker requires the service of the legal entity “IdP” (Identity Provider)7.  
In (a), the FutureID Broker is responsible for remote verification of the credential, including the (possibly 
cryptographic) verification of the credential and the extraction of identity attributes (data) from the 
credential. The FutureID Broker would then issue a signed assertion that contains identity attributes of 
the user (possibly filtered) and is sent through a user component (executor or browser) to the SP.  
In (b) the FutureID Broker redirects the user to the IdP, who is responsible for the remote verification of 
the credential and for issuing a signed assertion that is sent (through a user component) to the FutureID 
Broker. The FutureID Broker verifies this assertion (e.g., the signature) and that it comes from a trusted 
IdP (based on the IdPs certificate that signed the assertion). Then it extracts the user’s identity attributes 
from the assertion, and issues a new assertion that contains (a subset of) identity attributes which will be 
signed by the FutureID Broker. The second assertion is sent through a user component to the SP.  
Both scenarios in the Claims Transformer Mode can again happen in two different versions: either the 
user has the FutureID Client installed, or the user relies on the FutureID Broker (‘User-Broker’). If the 
user has a FutureID Client and an Executor installed, the user is in full control of passing the 
credential/assertions to IdP, Broker, and SP, respectively. The user also asks the Broker to issue a new 
assertion based on the one from the IdP. This means, there is no direct interaction between the IdP and 
the Broker, and between the Broker and the SP, but solely directly between the user and these legal 
entities. If the user is given appropriate information and then explicitly agrees to the data processing 
(depends on the user interface), the user has provided consent to the interactions with these legal 
entities.  If the user has only a browser and, therefore, relies on a User-Broker, the user will generally 
choose the User-Broker and have an account there. Data processing would be allowed as there would be 
a contract between the user and the User-Broker, providing consent for the processing. The User-Broker 
does not necessarily need to be different from the FutureID Broker connected to the SP.  The User-
Broker lets the user choose an authentication plan that determines:  the credential to be used, in case 
(2.b) the IdP to contact, in all cases the Broker to contact, and the SP.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
7
 The IdP can be the same entity as the issuer, but can also be a separate entity. 
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7. Liability in IdM context 
Trust is important for a functioning market place. This importance is referred in the first recital of the 
eIDAS Regulation8, stating that: 
“Building trust in the online environment is key to economic and social development. Lack of 
trust, in particular because of a perceived lack of legal certainty, makes consumers, businesses 
and public authorities hesitate to carry out transactions electronically and to adopt new 
services.”  
One important factor in establishing or increasing trust is the existence of a clear and effective system of 
liability.9 In general people trust the rule of law and the idea that “if anything goes wrong ‘someone will 
be liable’ for the damage caused to their property as a result of the other party’s misconduct”.10 
Therefore, trust can be promoted with the presence of a clear liability regime.11 This system should be 
“understandable, user-friendly, coherent and clear as to the responsibilities its rules impose and the 
conditions applied for the recovery of compensation”.12 
Liability can on the other hand also establish a market barrier. Strict liabilities can have chilling effects, 
and high requirements which demand substantial investments to comply with them (such as audits) may 
augment a barrier and decrease the market accessibility.13  
 
7.1 Liability risks and stakeholder expectations 
In a complex technical system, there are many things that can go wrong. Faulty identification or 
authentication, inadequate security and misuse of personal data, failure to follow appropriate 
procedures, may each give rise to liability.14  
                                                          
 
8
 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 
1999/93/EC (eIDAS). 
9
 Dimitrov p. 41.  
10
 G. Dimitrov, “Liability of Certification Service Providers”, PhD thesis, KU Leuven, 2007, p.86, referring to 
Balboni, Liability of CSPs towards relying parties and the need for a clear system to enhance the level of 
trust in electronic communication, Information&Communications Technology Law, Carfax Publishing, 
Vo.13, No.3, 2004, p.217.  
11
 G. Dimitrov, “Liability of Certification Service Providers”, PhD thesis, KU Leuven, 2007, p.86. 
12
 Dimitrov, p. 41.  
13
 J. Dumortier, N. Vandezande, “Trust in the proposed EU regulation on trust services?”, Computer Law 
and Security Report. nr.28 , 2012, pp. 568-576, p.571.  
14
 GINI 3.2, p.20.  
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In particular, there are two types of risks in authentication systems: either the user is given access to a 
service/content he/she is not entitled to access, or he/she is not able to access a service/content he/she 
is entitled to access. This might result in damages to the SP or/and to the user: 
1) The SP may suffer damage either when the SP acts in reliance on a false (or compromised) 
credential or assertion which it believed to be valid, or when the SP fails to rely upon a valid 
credential or assertion that it mistakenly believes to be false or compromised.15 
2) The user might suffer damage when his/her personal data is misused or compromised or he/she 
is denied authorization to conduct a transaction he/she would normally be entitled to.16  
These could be the result of many different failures. As an example, there could be an authentication 
with two FutureID Brokers (User-Broker and SP-Broker) in case of claims transformation with external 
IdPs, where the User-Broker derives and filters attributes and the SP-Broker acts as a validation authority 
for the SP and translates the assertion into a format acceptable by the SP. Several things could go wrong: 
the IdP could accept a false credential as authentic and provide information based on the false 
credential, or accept a credential but provide information which is not related to the credential; the 
User-Broker does not derive the right attributes or the information is sent further unfiltered (e.g. unique 
ID number is still in the data set) or the User-Broker could turn a response which does not provide the 
full information required into an adequate response by adding unverified information without indicating 
it; the SP-Broker could sign an assertion which is not based on the right authentication method or the 
new assertion does not have the same information as the original one or the SP could accept an 
assertion while the user is not appropriately authenticated and could give access to an unauthorized 
person.  
This list is not exhaustive. Failures must not necessarily result in (material, or generally measurable) 
damage; however, if they do they can result in liability. Under certain circumstances (e.g. contractual 
clauses, legal obligations), there can be liability even in the absence of damages.  
In the next section different sources of liability will be described and analysed.  
                                                          
 
15
 GINI 3.2, p.20.  
16
 GINI 3.2, p.20. 
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8. Sources of liability  
Liability exposure might stem from legal requirements, voluntary accepted obligations and/or general 
standards of diligent behaviour (‘bonus pater familias’, see section 8.1.2).17 We will start with non-
contractual liability, since this provides the basis of the remaining types of liability. The different 
responsibilities and resulting liability can be extended via contracts. In several EU countries, contract law 
has priority over tort law.18  
8.1 Non-contractual liability 
8.1.1 Legal obligations 
8.1.1.1 Data Protection Directive 
The Data Protection Directive does not only provide the rights of the data subject, but also the 
consequences in case of noncompliance, in order to ensure that the responsible entities are incentivized 
to comply with the obligations.19 Directive 95/46/EC contains a two-tiered approach: on the one hand, a 
pro-active approach where the responsible actors and their according obligations are identified; on the 
other hand, a reactive approach that, by introducing the risk of civil liability and sanctions intends to 
ensure that any damage caused by unlawful processing will be appropriately compensated.20  
The obligation of the controller to ensure the data protection rights can be found in art. 23 Directive 
95/46/EC, which states that persons who suffered damage as a result of unlawful processing operations 
or breach of national data protection legislation are entitled to compensation.21 The provision shows 
that the primary responsibility for compliance is assigned to the controller.22 The controller is the entity 
which decides on the why and how of the data processing.23 If the controller has the processing carried 
out by a processor, the controller must choose a processor which provides sufficient guarantees 
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 GINI 3.2, p. 20.   
18
 C. von Bar, U. Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe – A 
Comparative Study, Sellier.European Law Publishers, München, 2004, p.189. 
19
 B. van Alsenoy, “Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and “everything in between”: 
the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46/EC”, Computer law & security review 28 (2012), pp.  
25-43, p. 29.  
20
 B. van Alsenoy, “Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and “everything in between”: 
the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46/EC”, Computer law & security review 28 (2012), pp.  
25-43, p. 29.  
21
 Art. 23 (1) DPD. 
22
 B. van Alsenoy, “Allocating responsibility among controllers, processors, and “everything in between”: 
the definition of actors and roles in Directive 95/46/EC”, Computer law & security review 28 (2012), pp.  
25-43, p. 29. 
23
 For further explanation and an overview of possible controller processor constellations, please refer to 
D32.8. 
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regarding technical and organisational security measures.24 In this regard, the contract required by art. 
17 Directive 95/46/EC assumes particular importance, since it is not the processor who is generally 
directly liable, but instead the controller who is liable for breaches of data protection law towards the 
data subject.25 The liability of the processor would be towards the controller. In certain countries the 
liability of the processor can arise directly on tort grounds.26 An example of this is the implementation of 
the Directive in the Dutch Data Protection Act art. 49, which provides that “processors are liable for this 
harm where this was incurred as a result of their actions.”27 In contrast to this provision, the liability of a 
data processor is not regulated under the Federal German Data Protection Act28. However, the data 
processor may be still liable according to tort law.29 Furthermore, the data controller and the data 
processor are free to enter into an inter partes agreement on the liability of the data processor, including 
e.g. contractual penalties. 
Art. 23 (2) Directive 95/46/EC provides that (only) if the controller is able to prove that he is not 
responsible for the event giving rise to the damage (e.g. in cases of fault of the data subject or in case of 
force majeure), he can avoid this liability wholly or partially.30 The idea behind this is the protection of 
the economically weaker party, i.e. the data subject whose data is unlawfully processed.31 This 
protection is realised by giving the data subject in a civil proceeding the advantage of not bearing the 
burden of proof that the controller has caused the damage.32 Therefore the Directive establishes a 
presumption of causality which can be disproven by the controller by proving that he is not responsible 
for the event from which the damage results.33 However, the Data Protection Directive has been 
implemented differently in each Member State, and some countries have opted not to implement art. 23 
Directive 95/46/EC in this way.34 Belgium and Portugal implemented the Directive quite verbatim, while 
Danish law uses more elaborate terms.35 A similar situation exists under Federal German law. The data 
controller is liable for damages as far as it cannot prove that it “has exercised due care in accordance 
                                                          
 
24
 Dimitrov, p. 215.  
25
 Dimitrov, p. 215.  
26
 Dimitrov, p. 215.  
27
 Art. 49 (3) Wet van 6 juli 2000, houdende regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens).  
28
 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 14. Januar 2003 (BGBl. I S. 66), 
das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 25. Februar 2015 (BGBl. I S. 162) geändert worden ist"; 
neugefasst durch Bek. v. 14.1.2003 I 66; zuletzt geändert durch Art. 1 G v. 25.2.2015 I 162; (BDSG). 
29
 Gola/Klug/Körffer in Gola/Schomerus, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, § 7 rec. 16 et seq. 
30
 Art. 23 (2) DPD and recital 55 DPD.  
31
 Dimitrov, p. 217.  
32
 Dimitrov, p. 217.  
33
 Dimitrov, p. 217.  
34
 For example Ireland, see Dimitrov, p. 217.  
35
 D. Korff, p. 180, the Danish law states that a controller is liable for “any damage caused by the 
processing of data in violation of the provisions of this Act unless it is established that such damage could 
not have been averted through the diligence and care required in connection with the processing of data”.  
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D41.6  
 
 
Document name: SP4/ WP41 Page: 15 of 36 
Reference: 41.6 Dissemination:   PU Version:  Version 1.0 Status: Final 
 
 
with the circumstances of the case concerned”.36 The Dutch law provides that the level of damages can 
be reduced depending on the extent to which the person being sued can be held accountable for the 
damage, which is determined in accordance with the rules on full or partial liability.37 Finland, France and 
Luxembourg apply the ordinary rules on civil and administrative liability, while in Ireland the law 
stipulates that controllers and processors owe a “duty of care” to the data subject, which in effect results 
that any breach of the law can be considered a tort. As a consequence the liability of controllers can be 
different, depending on which law applies to the liability issue.38 It should be noted, however, that in the 
countries that follow the wording of the Directive the exemption cannot be avoided by contractual 
agreement, and considering the mandatory character of the provision it will probably also not be 
possible to agree upon a liability limitation in this regard.39 
 
8.1.1.2 eSignature Directive/eIDAS Regulation  
The eSignature Directive (Directive 1999/93/EC) was adopted on 13 December 1999 and entered into 
force in January 2000. It will be in force until 1 July 2016. It contains one provision on liability, Article 6, 
which states that Member States should ensure as a minimum that Certification Service Providers (CSPs) 
are liable for damage caused to any entity or legal or natural person who reasonably relies on certain 
information on a qualified certificate that has been issued or guaranteed by the CSP to the public.40 This 
is, for example, that, at the time of issuance, all information contained in the qualified certificate was 
accurate and all the details prescribed for a qualified certificate were present, that the signatory 
identified in the qualified certificate held the private key corresponding to the public key in the 
certificate, and the assurance that the keys can be used in a complementary manner in cases where the 
CSP generates them both.41 Furthermore, the CSP is liable for damage caused to a person who 
reasonably relies on the certificate if the CSP failed to register its revocation.42 The CSP can evade the 
liability if he can prove that he has not acted negligently. Another possibility for CSPs to limit their 
liability is to indicate limitations to the use of the certificate, and by limiting the value of transactions for 
which the certificate can be used, both possible if it is ensured that the limitations are recognisable to 
third parties.43 These provisions apply only to CSPs. At the current stage, the FutureID Broker is not 
considered to issue certificates as a CSP and therefore these provisions will generally not be applicable to 
                                                          
 
36
 § 7 BDSG. Different provisions for public bodies being a the data controller, § 8 BDSG. 
37
 D. Korff, p. 180.  
38
 This law might be different from the law that applies to the processing as such; D. Korff, p. 180.  
39
 Dimitrov, p. 217.  
40
 Art. 6 (1) Directive 1999/93/EC.  
41
 Art. 6 (1) a-c Directive 1999/93/EC.  
42
 Art. 6 (2) Directive 1999/93/EC.  
43
 Art. 6 (3) and (4) Directive 199/93/EC.  
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the FutureID Broker. However, they could be applicable to CIs/IdPs, in case they would qualify as CSPs 
issuing qualified certificates to the public.44  
The eIDAS Regulation45 will repeal the e-Signature Directive. The Regulation entered into force on 17 
September 2014 and its material provisions will be applicable as of 1 July 2016 (with exception to some 
provisions which apply earlier or later than this date). The eIDAS Regulation covers the 
creation/validation of electronic identities, electronic signatures, electronic seals, electronic time 
stamps, electronic documents, electronic delivery services and website authentication. However, with 
respect to eIDs, the Regulation focuses on the mutual recognition by Member States, whereas the other 
services are treated as market services.46 The Regulation is therefore divided in two sections: one on 
electronic identification (Chapter II) and the other one on trust services (Chapter III). Both contain 
liability provisions.  
In Chapter III, the liability of trust service providers is described in art. 13 eIDAS. Art. 13 states that trust 
service providers are liable for damage caused to any natural or legal person due to failure to comply 
with the obligations under the Regulation. The intention or negligence of a qualified trust service 
provider shall be presumed unless a qualified trust service provider proves otherwise. The burden of 
proof regarding a non-qualified trust service provider lies with the claimant. In D33.6 the definition of a 
trust service provider has been detailed considering the eSign service. Similar to the eSign service, the 
conclusion regarding the FutureID Broker is that, considering the current description of its 
functionalities, these do neither constitute a trust service, nor would the FutureID Broker be a trust 
service provider.  
In Chapter II of the Regulation, art. 11 provides strict liabilities for the notifying Member State, for the 
party issuing electronic identification means and the party operating the authentication procedure.47 
More specific, the party issuing the electronic identification means shall be liable for failures in ensuring 
that the electronic identification means is attributed to the right person in accordance with the technical 
specifications, standards and procedures for the relevant assurance level.48 The party operating the 
authentication procedure shall be liable for damage due to a failure in ensuring the correct operation of 
the authentication (online possibility for the relying party to confirm the person identification data 
received in electronic form).49 This only relates to cross-border transactions with notified eID means. It 
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 STORK2.0 D3.1 p. 15.  
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 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on 
electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing 
Directive 1999/93/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, L 257/73,  28.8.2014, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOL_2014_257_R_0002&from=EN 
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 STORK 2.0, D3.1, p. 23.  
47
 Art. 11 eIDAS. 
48
 Art. 11 (3) jo. Art. 7 (e) eIDAS.  
49
 Art. 11 (4) jo. Art. 7 (f) eIDAS.  
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becomes clear from the Regulation that the focus of its provisions is on notified national eID schemes 
and their use in cross-border public services. The role of the party issuing electronic identification means 
and the party operating the authentication procedure should be understood in this view. The role of 
Brokers such as the FutureID Broker is not specifically considered in this legal framework. In principle, 
the FutureID Broker as a legal entity in Claims Transformer Mode would be a relying party itself. The 
eIDAS Regulation could be applicable if the FutureID Broker would receive an assertion from a national 
operator of the authentication procedure, based on a notified eID. However, the Regulation provides 
that for relying parties other than public sector bodies the notifying Member State may define terms of 
access to that authentication.50 As recognizable from the recitals, the Commission considers it beneficial 
if the private sector would use eID means under a notified scheme. For instance, recital 17 states that 
Member States should encourage private sector involvement and includes that the authentication 
possibility provided by any Member State should be available to private sector relying parties under the 
same conditions, regardless whether they are in or outside the territory of the Member State.51 Whether 
or not the Member State makes their eID scheme available to private sector relying parties is left to the 
discretion of the Member States. However, even if the FutureID Broker would be accepted as relying 
party, the claims transformation and therefore the issuance of a new assertion based on the original eID 
would probably not fall under the scope of the Regulation. 
 
8.1.2 Tort law 
According to its recital 18, the eIDAS Regulation should provide for the liability of the Member States 
which notify an electronic identification means, of the party issuing it, and of the party operating the 
authentication procedure for failure to comply with the relevant obligations under the eIDAS Regulation. 
However, the express wording of the recital also provides that the Regulation should be applied in 
accordance with the national rules on liability. For instance, the definition of damages and the 
application of procedural rules including the burden of proof shall not be affected. Therefore, we will 
outline core aspects of European liability law, by focusing on common aspects and highlighting 
particularities in some Member States. 
This deliverable deals with legal issues related to the FutureID component Broker Service, which is only 
affected by the eIDAS provisions on electronic identification and not by its material provisions on 
electronic signatures services. As such, the extent to which the provisions on e.g. the effect of evidence 
                                                          
 
50
 Art. 7 (f) eIDAS.  
51
 Recital 17 eIDAS.  
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D41.6  
 
 
Document name: SP4/ WP41 Page: 18 of 36 
Reference: 41.6 Dissemination:   PU Version:  Version 1.0 Status: Final 
 
 
of electronic signatures52 might impact on the law of evidence in some Member States is not to be 
discussed at this point.53 
The difficulty with regard to tort law is that every country has its own concept of tort law, which has 
evolved over time. Even the notion of tort is not an exact term, since ‘tort’ is a typical common law term. 
‘European extra-contractual liability law excluding agency without authority and unjust enrichment’ 
might be a more accurate description, however, it has become common to use the word ‘tort’ in English 
academic writing.54 Due to the variations between national systems, it is difficult to provide an analysis 
that applies in general to all of them. Nevertheless, most systems do have some similarities. Most 
Member States base tort liability on the principle of fault. Fault liability refers to liability for intentional 
as well as negligent conduct.55 However, nearly all systems have also some categories of tort liability that 
are not based on fault, usually a form of strict liability.56 Strict liability implies that someone is liable 
regardless of whether he acted intentionally or negligently.57  
The different Member States have different requirements for liability based on negligent conduct. For 
example, France has one requirement (faute), England two (duty of care and breach of duty) and 
Germany three (Tatbestand, Rechtswidrigkeit, and Verschulden).58 However, to a certain extent they are 
alike, since the basic requirement for fault liability is intentional or negligent conduct. English and 
German law include additional requirements which mean that not every type of misconduct is sufficient 
for liability.59 The interpretation of fault has evolved over time from a more subjective approach, 
considering the individual qualities of the tortfeasor, to a more objective one which considers the 
behaviour itself.60 Therefore, nowadays, most European Member States use the objective standard, 
frequently presented as the famous ‘bonus pater familias’. The ‘bonus pater familias’ is a model of an 
average person, “not exceptionally gifted, careful or developed, neither underdeveloped nor someone 
who recklessly takes chances or who has no prudence”.61  For some countries the concept can be adapted 
to the personal circumstances or time and place (‘reasonable surgeon’, ‘careful barkeeper’)62 and for 
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 Critical with regard to German civil procedure law e.g. Jandt, Beweissicherheit im elektronischen 
Rechtsverkehr – Folgen der europäischen Harmonisierung, NJW 2015, 1205. 
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 C. van Dam, “European Tort Law”, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 5.  
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 C. van Dam, “European Tort Law”, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 78. 
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 P. Widmer, Comparative Report on Fault as a Basis of Liability and Criterion of Imputation (Attribution), 
in P. Widmer (Ed.), “Unification of Tort Law: Fault”, Kluwer, The Hague, 2005, p.333. 
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 C. van Dam, “European Tort Law”, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 78.  
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 C. van Dam, “European Tort Law”, Oxford University Press, 2013, p.136. 
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 C. van Dam, “European Tort Law”, Oxford University Press, 2013, p.136. 
60
 P. Widmer (Ed.), “Unification of Tort Law: Fault”, Kluwer, The Hague, 2005, p.32. 
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in P. Widmer (Ed.), “Unification of Tort Law: Fault”, Kluwer, The Hague, 2005, p. 348.  
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 P. Widmer, Comparative Report on Fault as a Basis of Liability and Criterion of Imputation (Attribution), 
in P. Widmer (Ed.), “Unification of Tort Law: Fault”, Kluwer, The Hague, 2005, p. 348.  
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specialists generally a higher ‘due care’ is evaluated according to their above average capacities. The 
behaviour of the tortfeasor is then measured against this standard. If the behaviour does not comply 
with this standard and the tortfeasor did not act with due care, it is accepted that there is fault.  
Further requirements for tort liability are the existence of a damage and a causal connection between 
the damage and the harmful behaviour.  
Damage 
Most Member States do not include a definition of damage in their legislation. Austria has a statutory 
definition (§1293 Austrian Code: “Damage is called every detriment which was inflicted on someone’s 
property, rights or person. This is distinguished from the loss of profit which someone has to expect in 
the usual course of events”).63 Distinction between damage and lost profits is a technical one and today 
in Austria the term ‘damage’ is normally understood in the broad sense as the whole harm including lost 
profit. Even though it may start form a ‘natural’ meaning of damage, damage is a legal concept and only 
that damage which can be recovered is damage in the eyes of the law.64 Courts and scholarly writing 
provide definitions in other countries, e.g. in Germany ‘any loss that somebody suffered with respect to 
his legally protected rights, goods and interests’, in Italy ‘a detriment capable to be evaluated from an 
economic standpoint’ and in the Netherlands ‘factual detriment arising from a certain occurrence’.65 All 
attempts agree that they presuppose a negative change (attributable to the wrongdoer) that must have 
taken place in the legally protected sphere of the injured party.66 In order to judge whether a change is 
negative, the judge will make a comparison between two states of affairs (the so-called 
“Differenzhypothese” compares the situation before and after the harmful event).67 However, the 
outcome depends on the positions which are included in the comparison and which worth is attributed 
to them. Therefore, the comparison is a method of assessing damages, but it does not in itself decide 
what constitutes recoverable damage.68 
As identified in Section 7.1, the possible damage that can occur is mainly at the SP and the user side. A SP 
may suffer damage either when the SP acts in reliance on a false (or compromised) credential or 
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 U. Magnus, ‘Comparative Report on the Law of Damages’, in u. Magnus (Ed.), “Unification of tort law: 
damages”, Principles of European Tort Law Volume 5, Kluwer, 2001, pp. 185-217, p. 190.  
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assertion which it believed to be valid, or when the SP fails to rely upon a valid credential or assertion 
that it mistakenly believes to be false or compromised.69 A user might suffer damage when his/her 
personal data is misused or compromised or he/she is denied authorization to conduct a transaction 
he/she would normally be entitled to.70 The scope of the damage would depend on the specific situation 
and would be upon the discretion of the judge.  
The difficulty of assessing damage 
The type of damages open for compensation might differ. Often courts are not eager to provide high 
compensation for immaterial damages and in general judges struggle to put a price to immaterial 
damages.  
In Germany, in cases in which damage will only be pure pecuniary loss71, no claim for damages may 
result since wealth is not protected under §823 (1) BGB. Pure pecuniary loss may, nevertheless, raise a 
claim for compensation under § 823 (2) BGB, but only in combination with a “protective law” 
(‘Schutzgesetz’). “Protective law” in the German legal system is a law which is intended to protect a 
person; according to the legislator’s incentives, such a law in its substance serves the protection of an 
individual against a defined type of damage.72 For instance, when tortious behaviour leads to an 
unauthorised access to data, such a protective law could be § 9 of the German federal data protection 
law, ‘Bundesdatenschutzgesetz’ (BDSG). This clause requires the controller to take the necessary 
technical and organisational measures to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the data 
protection act, ensuring especially the security of the data.73  
In the UK the data protection law in general provides for compensation for damage caused as a result of 
any failure on the part of a data controller to comply with the law. However, it is more restrictive with 
respect to “distress” (immaterial damage) than with respect to (material) damage, as distress can only be 
awarded if material damage has been proven.74 In such respect, the UK ruling is very interesting to 
demonstrate that over time countries can become more open to the possibility of awarding immaterial 
damage. A recent court case in the UK changes the current understanding of damage in the UK data 
protection act.75 The court ruled that misuse of private information is a tort. The judges concluded that 
article 23 Directive 95/46/EC has a wide meaning, including both material and non-material damage, 
establishing that the definition of damage in the UK act is not in line with the European Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC.  
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This example shows that with regard to the scope of damage in respect to data, no final understanding 
has been reached so far. It remains an ongoing discussion in how far immaterial damage shall be 
restituted, and how it should be assessed.    
Causation 
In order to establish liability for a damage, a connection between the liable person and the damage 
needs to exist. Most legal systems consider conditio sine qua non as a first test for causation. Only in 
Belgium conditio sine qua non is the sole requirement to be established and Belgium officially rejects the 
two step approach which other jurisdictions take as a theoretical framework.76 Conditio sine qua non 
requires the judge to determine whether an act or omission was a cause of the rights violation. This is 
done by considering whether the loss would still appear if the act or omission was eliminated. If the loss 
does not occur, the act or omission was not causal for the loss, if it does, the loss has been caused by the 
act or omission.77 The second step can be different in the different legal systems. Common law considers 
the ‘proximate cause’, which includes proximity in time and space, foreseeability of the harm and other 
factors.78 Other countries such as France, Germany, Greece and Austria use the test of adequate 
causation.79 In this regard the degree of probability is decisive. For example, in Austria, adequacy is 
established if the damaging event was to a considerable extent generally suitable for increasing the 
possibility of such a damage as in fact occurred.80  
As it is recognizable from the analysis, tort law varies in the different countries and therefore the scope 
of liability of the FutureID Broker generally depends on the applicable law, the exact tort and the 
discretion of the judge. As a general guideline, the FutureID Broker should ensure to comply with all 
applicable norms and standards and act with due care. In this regard it is useful for the FutureID Broker 
to log events, in order to be able to prove e.g. that systems were working according to the standards, 
and that no fault occurred at the Broker side.  
8.1.3 Conclusion non-contractual liability 
In this section we analysed the non-contractual liability that might be relevant to the FutureID Broker. 
The analysis was done considering Data Protection law, e-signature/eIDAS legislation and tort law. It 
becomes clear that for non-contractual liability tort law plays an important role. Data protection 
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obligations are often implemented in the national legislation that they are enforced via tort law. For data 
protection law, the practical division between controller and processor remains important. If the 
FutureID Broker is a controller, it will be the main responsible party which has to comply with the data 
protection obligations. In case of non-conformance, this can result in a higher liability risk. If the FutureID 
Broker is a processor, there are less obligations, but the Broker might still face liability claims. These 
might either be from the data subject on the basis of tort law, or the controller might hold the processor 
liable on the basis of contractual clauses in the controller-processor contract.   
The legislation on electronic signatures changed and was broadened under the eIDAS Regulation, 
covering also other trust services and notified identity services. In this regard, the risk of liability is lower 
for the FutureID Broker, as with its current service profile it does not qualify as a certification service 
provider/trust service provider in the sense of the legislation. The eIDAS Regulation provides liability for 
the party issuing the electronic identification means, the party operating the authentication procedure 
and the notifying Member State. However, the focus of the Regulation is on notified national eID 
schemes and their use in cross-border public services. The role of Brokers such as the FutureID Broker is 
not specifically considered in this legal framework. In principle, the FutureID Broker as a legal entity in 
Claims Transformer Mode could be a relying party itself. The eIDAS Regulation could be applicable if the 
FutureID Broker would receive an assertion from a national operator of the authentication procedure, 
based on a notified eID, giving the FutureID Broker some rights vis-à-vis the named parties. Nevertheless 
it has to be taken into account that the rules are intended for public services and the Regulation leaves 
the choice to accept private relying parties to the Member States, including the possibility to define 
terms of access, which could entail liability limitations.  
Finally, tort law is the general redress system. It varies substantially between Member States, but usually 
requires a fault, a damage and a causal connection between the fault and the damage. It will often be 
difficult for the user and the SP to demonstrate that they suffered a material damage. Non-material 
damage can be awarded, but the judges are often more reluctant in this regard. Taking into account the 
heightened importance of data, this might change in the future. The characterisation of the fault is 
another difficulty, as it is not yet defined which rights and obligations the FutureID Broker has.81 These 
might result from contracts under which the failure to comply with contractual obligations might not 
only give rise to pre-defined contractual liability, but also to tort liability.  
8.2 Contractual liability 
The technical components built in the FutureID project can be implemented in different ways. The idea 
of the FutureID project is that no centralized infrastructure exists, but instead it will be an ecosystem 
with free participation of an open number of stakeholders. Therefore, most likely a decentralized 
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governance structure will exist. This requires a certain amount of trust that the stakeholders need to 
place in each other. By itself, non-contractual liability might not be enough to foster this trust. Therefore, 
contractual liability might be an important trust enabler. In general, the interaction between the 
different actors will most likely be subject to a contractual network.  
Contractual networks can take at least four different legal forms:82  
 a multilateral contract (three or more parties agree to coordinate complex economic operations, 
typical examples being the contract of consortium): contract between A, B, C and D, each party 
undertakes obligations towards each party of the contract in order to achieve a common goal.83 
 
 
 
 a set of interdependent “linked” bilateral contracts 
 
 
 an intermediate form consisting of a multilateral contract as a framework contract and bilateral 
executory contracts between parties to regulate the specific elements of the transaction;  
 
 
 
 
 
 contracts for the benefit of a third party: A-B conclude a contract for the benefit of C and D, B-C 
one for A and D, etc.  
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8.2.1 Contractual relationships 
The decentralized governance structure would require that every actor enters into contracts with the 
other participants they want to work with/rely upon. The exact configuration of the contractual 
framework cannot be foreseen at this point, but presumably it will include at least these relationships. 
The user will normally have a (contractual) relationship with the CI/IdP and the SP. These relationships 
fall outside of the scope of FutureID. The user could furthermore have a contractual relationship with a 
FutureID Broker, which will be called the User-Broker here. This relationship will most likely be governed 
either by an individual (consumer) contract or by the terms and conditions set by the User-Broker, which 
the user needs to accept. This is a business to consumer (B2C) relation.  
We assume that the SP typically will have a contractual relationship with a FutureID Broker (SP-Broker) 
with which it has direct contact. This contractual relationship, among others, will ensure that only 
trusted credentials and intermediaries are used. Depending on the status of the FutureID Broker as 
controller or processor, the contract must include the relevant data protection clauses.  
User-Broker and SP-Broker can be a single legal entity, but can also be separate ones. Therefore, the 
FutureID Brokers can have contractual relationships with other FutureID Brokers. This could even result 
in a chain of different FutureID Brokers, all connected via contracts. Additionally, it needs to be assessed 
which actor is controller and which processor, and the contracts be drafted accordingly.  
Furthermore, it might be necessary that every FutureID Broker enters into contracts with the CIs/IdPs 
whose authentication services (remote verification of the credential and issuing of a signed assertion) 
the Broker uses. Especially in the beginning, when the FutureID Broker has a low bargaining position, this 
could often entail that the FutureID Broker will need to adhere to obligations set by the CIs/IdPs, since 
those often have a stronger market position. In this regard it is important to note that Art. 7(f) eIDAS 
provides that “for relying parties other than public sector bodies the notifying Member State may define 
terms of access to that authentication.” This might often preclude any bargaining possibilities. From a 
technological point of view, the communication between the FutureID Broker and CIs/IdPs is not direct. 
However, most current assertion technologies require that a Broker is explicitly listed in the assertion as 
intended recipient, which gives the possibility to the IdP to provide service only for selected Brokers and 
also to bill Brokers for rendered services.84 
With the exception of the contract entered with the user, all the remaining relationships would normally 
be business to business (B2B) relationships. Generally, the contents of B2B contracts can be freely 
decided by the contracting parties, since the principle of freedom of contract applies without legal 
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restrictions stemming from consumer protection legislation. However, for practical reasons, some topics 
should be addressed in the contracts:85 
- Role and responsibilities of each of the stakeholders 
- Agreements on applicable law and dispute resolution 
- Data protection compliance requirements 
- Possibly: Obligation to implement and follow inputs and instruction from the Governing Entity 
(including e.g. use of current code and update requirements, security requirements) 
- Possibly: Service Level Agreements 
- Liabilities that they accept towards each stakeholder, including financial limitations, possibly 
linked to applicable Levels of Assurance (LoAs).  
 
8.2.2 Liability and possible factors 
In theory, a wide range of liability models is possible. The SP could rely on an eID solution without any 
ability of recourse even if the FutureID Broker/IdP does not act in accordance with its stated practices; a 
capped liability is possible where the FutureID Broker/IdP might agree to indemnify SPs to a certain 
amount; an objective liability of the FutureID Broker/IdP might be installed; there might be a pooled 
liability scheme jointly funded by the participants of the FutureID system, etc.86 
Levels of Assurance (LoA) 
LoAs are used in identity management systems to indicate the degree of confidence. They should 
“characterise the degree of confidence in electronic identification means in establishing the identity of a 
person, thus providing assurance that the person claiming a particular identity is in fact the person to 
which that identity was assigned”.87 Different definitions and systems of assurance levels exist, resulting 
from projects such as the STORK project, and different standardisation activities88. 
Across the different LoAs, the introduction of the eIDAS Regulation might be positive. Art. 8 of the eIDAS 
Regulation describes three levels: low, substantial and high. LoA ‘low’ indicates identification means 
which only provide a limited degree of confidence, and the specifications, standards, procedures and 
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 based on STORK D3.1, p. 36f.  
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 GINI 3.2, p.20.  
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 eIDAS Regulation, recital 16.  
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 e.g. STORK Quality Authentication Assurance (QAA) model (Described in STORK D2.3, Quality 
authenticator scheme, https://www.eid-
stork.eu/index.php?option=com_processes&act=list_documents&s=1&Itemid=60&id=312), ISO 29115, 
ITU-T Recommendation X.1254 (https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1254-201305-I!Err1/en). 
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controls have the purpose to decrease the risk of misuse or alteration of the identity.89 ‘Substantial’ 
refers to identification means which provide a substantial degree of confidence, and the specifications, 
standards and procedures intent to decrease substantially the risk of misuse or alteration of the 
identity.90 The LoA ‘high’ finally refers to identification means which provide a higher degree of 
confidence than identification means with the LoA ‘substantial’, and the purpose of the technical 
specifications, standard, procedures and technical controls is to prevent misuse or alteration of the 
identity.91 The Commission issued an Implementing Regulation on assurance levels.92 The Implementing 
Regulation sets specifications and procedures in its Annex for determining the three different levels. This 
is done by considering not only the reliability and quality of the enrolment but also the electronic 
identification means management and the authentication itself.93 Furthermore, the general 
management and organisation of participants which provide a service related to electronic identification 
in a cross-border context is considered in assessing the assurance level.94 Based upon this, the assurance 
levels of electronic identification means can be determined. Considering that the requirements are 
supposed to be technology neutral, it should be possible to achieve them with different technologies.95   
When notifying an authentication means to the Commission according to art. 9 eIDAS, the notifying 
Member State has to indicate the LoA of the identification means, and the national assurance levels of 
notified national eID means shall be mapped against the eIDAS LoAs in the interoperability framework.96 
This indicates that the eIDAS assurance levels can become the generally accepted standards, which 
would make it easier to refer to them in contracts.  
In the FutureID contracts, the LoAs of the different electronic authentication means could be used to 
indicate different levels of accepted liability. For example, in a case where the eID means have no level of 
assurance or only a low level, it could be accepted that no recourse is possible. Differently, in cases of 
high assurance levels, the Broker/IdP might agree a stricter liability.  
Other factors 
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 art. 8 (2) (a) eIDAS.  
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 art. 8 (2) (b) eIDAS.  
91
 art. 8 (2) (c) eIDAS.  
92
 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1502 of 8 September 2015 on setting out minimum 
technical specifications and procedures for assurance levels for electronic identification means pursuant to 
Article 8 (3) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market.  
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 art. 1 (2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1502. 
94
 art. 1 (2) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1502. 
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 Recital 16 eIDAS Regulation, specifications in the Annex of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2015/1502.  
96
 art. 12 (4) (b) eIDAS.  
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At this point in time, it is not yet possible to determine the control level of each stakeholder. However, 
this can be of significance to assess the corresponding (potential) liability.97 An increased level of control 
will normally relate to an increased risk of liability. However, this might deter participants from taking 
more responsibilities within the FutureID Ecosystem. Therefore, in the contractual negotiations for a 
credible solution, it will be necessary to find a way of appropriately associating risk with responsibility 
without precluding the potential of participation as a result.98 The possibility of obtaining insurance 
coverage against certain liability risks could assume relevance. Another influencing factor could be the 
bargaining position of the stakeholders, as indicated in 8.2.1.  
8.2.2.1 Governing entity 
The choice between the possible contractual frameworks will depend on the different stakeholders. 
However, if the different stakeholders intend to work under a single trade mark or distinctive sign (e.g. 
“FutureID”), any misbehaviour of one stakeholder might result in detrimental consequences and general 
loss of trust for every participant. In this case it can be advisable to have a governing authority, which 
sets standards, provides code and supervises the adherence to the rules. This governing authority could 
also provide some general terms (especially regarding liability) that need to be obeyed, which could 
balance otherwise possibly existing imbalances in bargaining powers.  
 
8.2.2.2 Liability in contractual chains 
Where the participants in the ecosystem enter into bilateral contracts with other participants they have 
a direct relation with, but not with previous participants (e.g. the SP will have a contract with the 
FutureID Broker, but not with the IdP on whose assertion the SP will basically rely upon), a contractual 
chain is established. In this contractual chain the trust needs to be ensured. This can be done via liability.  
The principle that a contract can only confer rights and impose obligations to the contracting parties is 
known in civil countries as “relativity of contract”. In common law systems, it is termed “privity of 
contract”.99 The doctrine of privity/relativity entails two prohibitions: (1) contractual duties cannot be 
imposed on an unconsenting third party, (2) third parties cannot acquire rights under a contract to which 
they are not a party.100 In most European legal orders, to prevent contract law from “drowning in a sea 
of torts”, the principle of privity (or relativity) of contract is flanked in tort law by the principle that a 
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 M. Ebers, A. Janssen, O. Meyer (ed), European Perspectives on Producers’ Liability, sellier.european 
law publishers, 2009, p. 7.  
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 M. Ebers, A. Janssen, O. Meyer (ed), European Perspectives on Producers’ Liability, sellier.european 
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pure economic loss is only eligible for compensation under very specific circumstances. This ensures that 
tort cannot be used to indirectly expand the sphere of contractual obligations.101 
An example of this can be seen in the sale of goods. Goods are usually supplied along a distribution 
chain, starting with the producer, continuing with the importer, the wholesaler, the final seller and lastly 
the consumer.102 Similar to what is foreseen to occur with FutureID, the contractual relations in the 
distribution chain are often done via a number of individual, bilateral contracts.103 The European 
Consumer Sales Directive (Directive 1999/44/EC) harmonises the rights and remedies available to 
consumers where the goods sold do not conform to the contract.104 The one liable to the consumer for 
any non-conformity is the final seller of the consumer goods.105 However, art. 4 of the Directive provides 
the final seller with a right of redress:  
“Where the final seller is liable to the consumer because of a lack of conformity resulting from an 
act or omission by the producer, a previous seller in the same chain of contracts or any other 
intermediary, the final seller shall be entitled to pursue remedies against the person or persons 
liable in the contractual chain. The person or persons liable against whom the final seller may 
pursue remedies, together with the relevant actions and conditions of exercise, shall be 
determined by national law.” 
However, in most countries this claim of redress can only be brought against the supplier, which would 
then have a claim against his contractual partner and so on, until the liability reaches the responsible 
party.106  
Differently from the sale of consumer goods, no European laws (except for the eIDAs Regulation, which 
only covers the liability in case of notified eID schemes for public services) specifically regulate the 
liability within (federated/user-centric) identity management contractual chains. However, the doctrine 
of privity/relativity entails that any claim for redress can only be against the other party of the contract. 
Therefore back-to-back liability arrangements can be useful in FutureID. The approach of contractual 
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(liability) chains is especially interesting with respect to a privacy-friendly implementation of the 
FutureID infrastructure. This is explained in more detail in D12.9. 
8.2.3 Conclusion contractual liability 
The reference architecture allows the components to be implemented in different ways. In general it 
envisages a strongly decentralized deployment. This would entail that every participant of the FutureID 
ecosystem would enter into contracts with the party they rely upon. As explained, this will normally 
result in a chain of contracts. As such, it is important that the FutureID Broker enters into back-to-back 
liability arrangements to ensure that there is no gap in contract coverage that would leave the Broker 
with uncovered risks. If the FutureID Broker has to take on certain responsibilities that cannot be 
covered in contracts for example with the IdP, it might be an option to take an insurance to reduce the 
risk. In order to have a stable system, and particularly where a single trade mark or distinctive sign is 
used, a governing entity should establish and (possibly) enforce the obligations of the different 
participants. Participating parties should consider in their contracts the role and responsibilities of each 
partner. Furthermore, they should agree on applicable law and dispute resolution and which liabilities 
are accepted towards each stakeholder (including financial limitations). They should additionally enter 
into Service Level Agreements and provide for obligations to implement and follow inputs and 
instructions from the governing entity. Finally they should also cover the data protection requirements, 
possibly by means of controller-processor contracts.  
8.3 Liability exemption 
This final subsection will analyse whether the FutureID Broker might be able to make use of the liability 
exemptions provided by Directive 2000/31/EC.107  
The FutureID Broker acts as an intermediary in the authentication process. It is likely that the FutureID 
Broker will provide its service for some kind of remuneration. Furthermore, the service will be provided 
at a distance, by means of electronic equipment, and at the individual request of a recipient of the 
service. Therefore, the FutureID Broker will provide an information society service under art. 2 (a) 
Directive 2000/31/EC. None of the exclusion of application under art. 1(5) Directive 2000/31/EC apply 
and, therefore, the FutureID Broker shall be subject to the provisions of Directive 2000/31/EC. This 
section analyses whether the FutureID Broker is eligible for the liability exemptions provided in this legal 
instrument.  
Directive 2000/31/EC provides three liability exemptions for intermediaries: mere conduit, caching and 
hosting. Mere conduit aims at transmission services (information goes from computer to computer) and 
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access services.108 Transmission means a transfer of information from computer to computer.109 This 
information will be stored on any of the computers for a short moment of time.110 This temporal storage 
can be considered part of a “transmission” if the storage is automatic (by machines, not humans), 
intermediate (in the course of a transmission) and transient (for a limited period of time).111 The storage 
needs to be made for the single purpose of facilitation of the transmission, and the information may not 
be stored any longer than is reasonably necessary for this goal.112 For the exemption to apply, the SP 
needs to fulfil certain requirements. The SP must ensure that it did not initiate the transfer of data, nor 
select the recipients of the data, nor modify the transmitted data.113 As recognizable from this, the 
exemption only applies “where the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the 
technical process of operating and giving access to a communication network”.114 The information 
society service provider may in no way be involved with the transmitted information, and the only 
allowed way of modification of the information is manipulation of a technical nature in the course of 
transmission, which does not alter the integrity of the information contained.115 However, where the 
legal system of a Member State provides for it, it is still possible for a court or administrative authority to 
order the SP to terminate or take measures to prevent a particular infringement.116 It is possible that the 
FutureID Broker in the dispatcher mode might fall under this exemption, if it only routes the information 
to the SP, but is in no way involved in any decision or changes to the content.  
The other two exemptions are caching and hosting, which both apply to storage of information. Caching 
is “the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of […] information, performed for the sole 
purpose of making more efficient the information’s onward transmission to other recipients of the service 
upon their request”.117 Hosting can be described as the storage of information which has been provided 
by the recipient of the service. The information society service provider shall not be liable for the 
information which is stored at the request of a recipient of the service, if it does not have actual 
knowledge of illegal activity or information. It is unlikely that these exceptions could apply to the 
FutureID Broker in any of the modes, as it will not store the information, neither to make it faster 
accessible nor to host it for the user or SP.  
In general, the Member States can impose two obligations on information society service providers, 
regardless whether they meet the exemptions or not: they can oblige them to inform the authorities of 
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illegal activities/information, as soon as the information society service provider becomes aware of 
them, and to disclose the identity of recipients with whom they have storage agreements.118 
The noncompliance with these requirements does not result in liability per se. It only means that the 
information society service provider cannot make use of the exemptions.  
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9. Dutch case-study 
In the Netherlands, there have been two important cases demonstrating the vulnerability of eID 
schemes. The first relates to the DigiD system and was caused by a system of authorisations that turned 
out to be susceptible to fraud. The second example is the Diginotar case, where a Dutch certification 
provider was compromised by a hack. 
The DigiD system allowed third parties to manage government affairs on behalf of interested parties. The 
so-called DigiD Machtigen (DigiD Authorisation) turned out to be susceptible to abuse as it did not 
provide adequate guarantees. Instead, it easily allowed to amend the personal information of the DigiD 
holder, including bank account information. This allowed benefits to be wired to a third party account, 
having the DigiD holder deprived of those benefits. Malicious third parties convinced DigiD holders that 
they were kind enough to “help” them fill out their benefit forms, while in fact they amended the 
personal data of the  DigiD holder, redirecting the benefits to their own account.  
In another large scale fraud case with DigiD, personal information of over 50 Dutch students was stolen, 
most probably by simply getting the DigiD confirmation letters with activation codes from the students’ 
mailboxes. By changing students’ information, users were locked out of their own accounts and their 
money and other benefits were rerouted to different accounts. 
The liability of the malicious third parties is of limited relevance to the present analysis. It is enough to 
mention that the cases were resolved and that the system for authorizations has been changed to 
prevent fraud. The relevance of the example to FutureID lays in the (potential) accountability of DigiD. 
There were no Dutch court cases against the ministry responsible for DigiD or the tax authorities that 
relied on DigiD. So the authorities were not held accountable for the problems. In fact, a lower Dutch 
administrative court ruled that the Ministry of Economic and the tax authorities are not responsible for 
the fraud or its consequences. On the contrary, the Dutch tax authorities have tried to claim money back 
from DigiD holders with whose DigiD benefits had been claimed that turned out to be fraudulent. The 
Dutch highest administrative court, The Council of State (Raad van State), ruled that in principle the 
holder of a DigiD was responsible for the DigiD and its correct use, and thus for keeping it confidential 
and free from abuse. However, in this specific case, the court stated that: “The case revealed that it has 
been possible, during a very limited period in 2010, to file a DigiD request in name of someone else. As 
the tax authority was unable to prove whether the DigiD holder herself, or a malicious third party in her 
name, has requested and used the DigiD without knowledge of the defendant, the defendant is not 
responsible to pay back the benefits the tax authority provided”.  
The second case, Diginotar, was about a compromised Dutch certificate authority. In order to conduct 
trusted business online, websites require certificates. These are used to prove the identity of the web 
site operator and are known as SSL certificates. For transactions with the government (e.g. the Dutch tax 
authority and the use of DigiD) other certificates – Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates – are used. 
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If a certificate gets compromised, so-called ‘man-in-the-middle’ attacks (MITM)119 can take place. In the 
Dutch DigiNotar case, the system was hacked, leading to fraudulent certificates. It soon became clear 
that not only the Internet certificates, but also the government certificates were at issue. Government 
stepped in, DigiNotar went bankrupt and a process of transition to other PKI certificate suppliers was put 
in motion.  
Under the Dutch Telecommunications Act (Telecommunicatiewet), the Dutch Telecommunication 
authority is charged with supervising ‘qualified certificates’ (also called ‘digital signatures’). The PKI 
certificates at issue belong to these regulated certificates in need of registration with the Dutch 
Telecommunications Authority, for which the Authority can also decide to withdraw the registration. 
This happened with DigiNotar, which was forced to withdraw the qualified certificates that had been 
issued within 14 days.  
In respect of liability, the Dutch Civil Code contains article 6:196b BW, but the same only applies to 
qualified certificates. The normal liability regime of breach of contract and unlawful act is applicable to 
other certificates. Since the SSL-certificates of DigiNotar were not qualified certificates, 6:196b BW did 
not apply. 
Instead, the issue would be one of contractual liability. DigiNotar has a contractual obligation to its 
customers to deliver well-functioning SSL-certificates. If DigiNotar stops fulfilling its obligation, there is a 
breach of contract and a claim for damages can be filed (art. 6:74 of the Dutch Civil Code). However, the 
success of such a claim is not clear as, under the applicable general terms and conditions, there was a 
limitation of DigiNotar’s liability. As Diginotar claims its certificates to be trustworthy (and this turned 
out not to be the case), a claim for damages can also be based on this incorrect statement, opening the 
possibility for a claim on the basis of unlawful conduct (art. 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code).  
These national cases show that authentication systems are complex, many parties are involved, and it is 
difficult to prove what exactly caused the failure. In general the approach seems to be that the 
authentication means and the system are deemed secure, and if something goes wrong it is expected 
that it has been the fault of the user (see the example of DigiD). Therefore in practice the risk for other 
parties to be held liable seems rather small. The case of Diginotar shows that, as far as is known, 
Diginotar was not held liable by users. However, the example shows very well that losing the trust  of the 
users can have detrimental economic consequences, in this case bankruptcy. For FutureID this shows 
that even though the liability risk of the FutureID Broker might in praxis at the moment not be very high, 
the loss of trust could form an even higher risk than possible liability claims.  
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10. Conclusion 
This deliverable aimed to provide an analysis of the legal framework surrounding the FutureID Broker 
with a special focus on liability.  
With this purpose, it starts with an introduction to the functioning of the FutureID Broker and the 
FutureID Ecosystem. This was followed by information on the importance of liability within the identity 
management context as an enabler of trust by providing a high-level conceptualization of the various 
expectations held by the different entities that participate in FutureID. The main part of this deliverable 
provides an overview of the different sources of liability and how they could apply to the FutureID 
Broker. This starts with an overview of non-contractual liability by considering Data Protection law, e-
signature/eIDAS legislation and tort law. It becomes clear that tort law plays an important role for non-
contractual liability. For data protection law, the distinction between controller and processor remains 
important, as if the FutureID Broker is a controller, it will be subject to more stringent obligations and, 
hence, a higher risk for liability. On the other hand, if the FutureID Broker is simply a processor, it shall 
be subject to less onerous obligations, although it might still face liability claims. Depending on the 
national implementation of the data protection law, the FutureID Broker might be held directly liable as 
a processor, or via contractual clauses in the controller-processor contract by the controller/SP.   
The legislation on electronic signatures changed, and was broadened under the eIDAS Regulation. It 
covers now other trust services and notified identity services. The FutureID Broker will most likely not 
have to face liability under the e-signature Directive or eIDAS Regulation, as with its current service 
profile it does not qualify as a certification service provider/trust service provider in the sense of the 
legislation. The role of Brokers such as the FutureID Broker is not specifically considered under the eIDAS 
Regulation. In principle, the FutureID Broker as a legal entity in Claims Transformer Mode would be a 
relying party. If the FutureID Broker would receive an assertion from a national operator of the 
authentication procedure, based on a notified eID, the eIDAS provision might give the FutureID Broker 
some rights vis-à-vis the party issuing the electronic identification means, the party operating the 
authentication procedure or the notifying Member State. Nevertheless it has to be taken into account 
that the rules are aimed at public services and that the Regulation leaves the choice to accept private 
relying parties to the Member States, including the possibility to define terms of access, which could 
entail liability limitations. Finally, tort law varies substantially between Member States, but usually 
requires a fault, a damage and a causal connection between the fault and the damage. It will often be 
difficult for the user and the SP to demonstrate that they suffered a material damage. Non-material 
damage can be awarded, but the judges are often more reluctant in this regard. Taking into account the 
heightened importance of data, this might change in the future. The characterisation of the fault is 
another difficulty, as it is not yet defined which rights and obligations the FutureID Broker has. These 
might result from contracts, under which the failure to comply with contractual obligations might not 
only give rise to pre-defined contractual liability, but also to tort liability. 
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The contractual liability will depend on the exact provisions in the contracts. The reference architecture 
allows the components to be implemented in different ways. In general it envisages a strongly 
decentralized deployment. This would entail that every participant of the FutureID ecosystem would 
enter into contracts with the party they rely upon. As explained, this will result in a chain of contracts. As 
such, it is important that the FutureID Broker enters into back-to-back liability arrangements to ensure 
that there is no gap in liability coverage that would leave the Broker with uncovered risks. In particular 
when a single trade mark or distinctive sign would be used, it might be advisable that a governing entity 
would establish and (possibly) enforce obligations for the different participants. Points which should be 
considered in the contracts are the role and responsibilities of each partner, the applicable law and 
dispute resolution and which liabilities are accepted towards each stakeholder (including financial 
limitations). The contracting partners should also consider Service Level Agreements and provide for 
obligations to implement and follow inputs and instructions from the governing entity. Finally they 
should also cover the data protection requirements, possibly by means of controller-processor contracts.  
To complete the analysis, the position of the FutureID Broker under the Directive 2000/31/EC was 
assessed. The provisions of this Directive seem to apply as the FutureID Broker will provide an 
information society service. However, it does not seem likely that the FutureID Broker can benefit from 
the liability exemptions. An exception might be the Broker in Dispatcher Mode, who might be able to 
invoke the exemption of mere conduit (this is however disputable). As the FutureID Broker will not 
provide a hosting service, it is clear that the exemptions of caching and hosting are not applicable.  
Finally the analysis concludes with examples of failures in authentication systems in the Netherlands. 
These examples show that the risk of liability claims is currently reduced and can be countered with 
limited liability clauses. However, a bigger risk is the loss of trust, which can finally result in bankruptcy.  
Therefore, it is advisable that the FutureID Broker establishes adequate liability limitations and back-to-
back liability arrangement, while at the same time ensuring the trust between all the parties. This could 
include the provision of simple redress mechanisms and support and contact points. This would allow 
users to have support when problems arise and avoid them to be forced to prove what went wrong in a 
system they do not understand. Finally, logging is advisable, as it can provide evidence in the question 
whose fault the failure was, and therefore facilitate getting redress from the liable party.   
 
